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Abstract
The authors were motivated to write this article by South Korea’s steps to amend its 
corporate law to permit the use of the shareholder rights plan (poison pill). Poison pills are 
permitted in some of the world’s most sophisticated economies, and they have engendered strong 
opinions and changed the face of corporate law in the most well-established of jurisdictions. This 
article first looks back at the poison pill’s history in the United States and Japan, highlighting the 
advances and setbacks that might have predictive value for Korea. To accomplish this, we borrow 
a framework from Ronald Gilson and then look at case law precedent, existing and proposed 
legislation, strategies for the regulation and deployment of poison pills, and parties available to 
police its use. This article goes on to consider how a transplant of the poison pill doctrine into 
Korean M&A law could play out; focusing less on predicting the outcome and more on 
identifying the key success factors and potential pitfalls, and highlighting the importance of 
ongoing corporate governance reform.
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I. Introduction
On March 2, 2010, the Korean Cabinet approved amendments to the 
Korean Commercial Code (“KCC”) to permit the use of the poison pill 
takeover defense by Korean companies. The bill is slated to take effect in 
2011, but first must be approved by the National Assembly, where it is 
expected to cause intense debate.1) Controlling shareholder-managers, like 
the powerful heads of the Chaebol in Korea, certain governmental bodies, 
and business lobby groups have praised the poison pill for its ability to 
protect management from short-term market fluctuations and allow them 
to focus on long-term profitability rather than on propping up the stock 
price.2) Shareholder rights organizations, civic groups, and opposition party 
lawmakers counter that these benefits come at too great a cost;3) poison pills 
also provide management and controlling shareholder-managers the 
ultimate tool to entrench themselves by unilaterally blocking value-
increasing acquisition attempts, often at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
The debate surrounding the poison pill, also known as a shareholder 
rights plan,4) has been ongoing since the device was first put to use in the 
United States in 1982. This is not surprising as it is a very powerful tool. On 
its own, it is a formidable obstacle to an acquirer because it greatly dilutes a 
hostile bidder’s equity stake when triggered, by allowing all other 
1) Hyo-sik Lee, Seoul to Adopt ‘Poison Pill’ Against Hostile M&A, Korea Times, Mar. 2, 
2010.
2) Eun-jung Kim, S. Korea to Adopt Poison Pill System Against Hostile Takeovers, Korea 
Herald, Mar. 2, 2010. 
3) Id.
4) According to a widely-accepted definition, “the essence of the poison pill is that the 
crossing by an acquirer of a relatively low threshold of ownership triggers rights for target 
shareholders in relation to the shares of either the target or the acquirer, from which the 
acquirer itself is excluded and which render the acquisition of further shares in the target 
fruitless or impossibly expensive.” Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in The 
anaTomy of CorporaTe law: a ComparaTive and funCTional approaCh 225, 238-239 (reinier 
Kraakman et al. eds., 2009). See Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 Colum. l. rev. 1168 (1999); Lucian 
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 57 Bus. law. 1047 
(2002).
 Importing Hazardous Substances from the United States?   |  3No. 1: 2010
shareholders to purchase additional shares at a substantially reduced price. 
When paired with other takeover defenses such as the staggered board, it 
can become terminally effective.5) The United States and Japan both allow 
poison pills and can bring valuable insight to the debate, including 
scholarship on the mechanics and implementation of poison pills and rich 
judicial precedent regarding takeover defenses generally. These experiences 
with the pill reveal its amorphous nature—it cannot be easily classified as 
good or bad, and the implementation and maintenance it requires are far 
more complex than its initial adoption. This means that any attempt to 
judge the poison pill’s suitability for the Korean corporate realm must 
consider how use of the poison pill will be restricted and how its evolution 
will be controlled. This paper explores these questions. Part II lays the 
groundwork for analysis with a discussion of the economics behind the 
market for corporate control and introduces Ronald Gilson’s efficiency test. 
Part III summarizes the legal history of the poison pill in the United States. 
Part IV analyzes the Japanese experience since its introduction of the poison 
pill in 2005, offering a look at how the poison pill works when transplanted 
into a new environment.6) Part V presents a comparative analysis to the 
Korean experience and reviews changes in the KCC. Part VI presents some 
concluding thoughts.
II. Market Efficiency and the Gilson Framework 
In 2004, on the eve of Japan’s adoption of the poison pill, Ronald Gilson 
predicted the introduction of the shareholder rights plan and evaluated its 
potential.7) Gilson explained the forces at work in the market for corporate 
control and laid out a simple two-question framework for analyzing the 
economic and political infrastructure regulating the poison pill’s use in a 
5) Lucian Bebchuk, John Coats IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover 
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 sTan. l. rev. 887 (2002). 
6) See generally Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and 
Explanations from Japan and the United States, 150 u. penn. l. rev. 527 (2001).
7) Ronald J. Gilson, The Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, 2004 Colum. Bus. 
l. rev. 21.
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given country.8) He suggested that the market for corporate control serves 
as an equilibrating mechanism, which moves assets into the hands of the 
firms that value them the most.9) These distributions are constantly 
re-evaluated due to changes in technology, business strategy, and the 
regulatory environment. Such recurrent evaluations result in a continuous 
stream of M&A activity. However, because the market is driven by Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency rather than just Pareto efficiency,10) some parties are often 
put in a worse position as a result of changes in corporate control.11) 
Complications arise because the target company’s management team often 
bears the brunt of the Kaldor-Hicks’ downside. However, they possess the 
power to reject transactions that would be disadvantageous to their 
positions. 
Once self-dealing activity reaches a certain level, hostile takeovers will 
begin occurring so that acquirers can bypass the management and take 
their offer directly to the stockholders. However, hostile takeovers alone are 
not a solution to the efficiency problem because they shift the power to 
interfere with market allocation from the target to the acquirer by 
interfering with the target’s ability to reject all transactions, not just 
unattractive ones. This means that any time a company sacrifices short-
term profitability to achieve long-term growth, an exploitable arbitrage 
opportunity may arise from a temporarily depressed stock price. Corporate 
raiders can swoop in, execute a hostile acquisition, and sell the company’s 
assets for a profit; but in some cases, the target firm was making the best 
long-term use of those assets. Thus hostile takeovers can theoretically cause 
a massive overcorrection in the market. In this manner, the hostile takeover 
is a weapon that can be wielded for both corrective and disruptive 
purposes.  
8) Id. at 28-29.
9) Id. at 28. 
10) Pareto improvements are allocational changes that can be made which make at 
least one party better off without making any party worse off. Pareto efficiency is achieved 
once no further Pareto improvements are possible. Kaldor-Hicks improvements are 
allocational changes that result in a net improvement, even if one party bears all the costs 
and none of the benefits. See william allen eT al., CommenTaries and Cases on The law of 
Business organizaTion 4-5 (2nd ed. 2007).
11) Gilson, supra note 7, at 29.
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The poison pill is a powerful tool against hostile takeovers, giving the 
target company’s management the ability to block inefficient hostile 
acquisitions that would be detrimental to the target’s shareholders.12) In an 
unfortunate twist, the poison pill ironically carries with it the overlapping 
drawbacks of the hostile takeover—it is too powerful and can be used to 
block value-increasing transactions when in the hands of self-interested 
management. Intuitively, this raises the concern that the situation is no 
different than the starting point since it shifts the power to self-deal back to 
the target management (Theory #1, below). However, if introduced at the 
right time and with proper mitigating forces, then presumably each 
additional shift brings the market closer to equilibrium (Theory #2, below) 
rather than simply causing a binary power shift. 
In light of this, any country that is considering adopting a poison pill 
should ask itself the following question: For a country that has allowed 
hostile acquisitions, will adopting a poison pill increase market efficiency 
by blocking inefficient hostile transactions, or will the realized gain be 
overshadowed by self-interested agents who will use the pill to block 
12) Harm to the shareholders occurs during hostile takeovers when the premium 
offered by the acquirer is worth less than the present value of the stock at a future date. 
Although it is impossible to determine the outcome had the transaction been 
consummated, the target company’s management is in the best position to estimate future 
value. 
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efficient hostile transactions? Gilson poses two key questions to judge 
whether a poison pill should be adopted:
a. How will the poison pill be policed to prevent defensive tactics 
motivated by management self-interest, and 
b. Who will be the policeman?13)
In the following sections, we consider these two questions along with 
the aforementioned timing and efficiency concerns to review and evaluate 
in turn the poison pill’s use in the United States, Japan, and Korea. 
III. The Poison Pill in the United States
In the 25 years since the Delaware court endorsed the use of the poison 
pill in Moran v. Household International, a complex body of case law has 
developed to govern the takeover defense, and corporate governance 
institutions have pressured boards to increase shareholder input on 
takeover defenses. The following is a brief historical look at case law and 
shareholder activism surrounding the poison pill in the United States.14)
1. Case Law
Three years after the first poison pill was put in place, the Delaware 
Supreme Court decided Moran v. Household International Inc.15) The case 
applied Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum16) to the flip-over rights plan. The court 
13) Gilson, supra note 7, at 29.
14) For a current outline describing the legal environment relating to takeovers, see 
waChTell, lipTon, rosen & KaTz, TaKeover law and praCTiCe (2010). See also ronald gilson 
& Bernard BlaCK, The law and finanCe of CorporaTe aCquisiTions 801–895 (2nd ed. 1995).
15) Moran v. Household International Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
16) Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal 
at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 del. J. Corp. l. 769 (2006); Ronald Gilson, 
Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 del. J. Corp. l. 491 (2001); 
Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: 
“Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 Tex. l. rev. 261 (2001).
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held that the decision to adopt a defensive mechanism to protect against 
future unwanted takeover bids is protected by the business judgment rule, 
and noted that pre-planning may reduce the risk of the board failing to 
exercise reasonable judgment when forced to act quickly in the face of a 
hostile bid. 
Unocal is not a poison pill case, but it is highly relevant to all takeover 
defenses a target board enacts. In April 1985, Mesa Petroleum, which 
owned approximately 13% of Unocal’s stock, commenced a two-tier cash 
tender offer. At the front end, Mesa offered a cash tender for approximately 
37% of Unocal’s outstanding stock at a price of $54 per share. At the back 
end, Mesa offered $54 of highly subordinated junk bonds.17) After receiving 
a fairness opinion that found Mesa’s bid to be wholly inadequate, Unocal’s 
board unanimously approved a discriminatory self-tender offer resolution, 
providing that if Mesa acquired 37% of Unocal stock through its offer, 
Unocal would buy the remaining 49% of outstanding shares for an 
exchange of debt securities having an aggregate par value of $72 per share. 
The self-tender resolution excluded Mesa. 
The case was reviewed by the Delaware Supreme Court, which found 
that such discriminatory treatment against Mesa is not invalid per se 
because the board’s duty of care extends to protecting the corporation from 
perceived harm whether from third parties or shareholders.18) The 
Delaware Supreme Court established a two-prong test to determine 
whether the board’s implementation of defense mechanisms in reaction to a 
pending takeover bid is appropriate. First, the board must prove the 
existence of an actual threat to the corporate policy and effectiveness posed 
by a hostile bidder.19) In order to satisfy this burden, the board must show 
good faith and reasonable investigation. Further, the court added that the 
proof is materially enhanced if the board is comprised of a majority of 
independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing 
17) Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949-50.
18) Id. at 952.
19) Id. at 955 (“In the face of this inherent conflict, directors must show that they had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness 
existed because of another person’s stock ownership”).
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standards.20) In establishing that the board is reacting to a threat to the 
corporate value, it must show that it is acting without a primary purpose of 
management entrenchment.21) The second prong of the Unocal test states 
that the defensive mechanism must be proportionate to the threat and not 
“draconian.”22) To determine whether the defensive mechanisms are 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed, the court may consider the 
following factors: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the 
offer, questions of illegality, impact on constituencies other than 
shareholders, risk of non-consummation, and quality of securities being 
offered in the exchange.23) Timing of the bid is an important factor in 
considering whether the response is proportional. As illustrated in 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated,24) the Delaware 
Supreme Court found that the defensive mechanisms put in place were 
reasonable due to Paramount’s “eleventh hour offer.” Such timeframes by 
the bidder shift the board’s responsibilities to a higher standard by 
requiring an immediate response to address the threat to the corporate 
value and shareholders’ interests. 
This proportionality prong was further fleshed out in Unitrin, Inc. v. 
American General Corp.25) Under the Unocal-Unitrin standard, takeover 
defenses will, as a rule, only be found disproportionate (i.e., “draconian”) if 
they are “coercive” (if they “cram down” a management-sponsored 
alternative on the shareholders)26) or “preclusive” (they make a successful 
takeover “mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable”).27) 
Unitrin suggests that a takeover defense cannot be deemed preclusive as 
20) Id. at 955. 
21) Id. at 954, citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) (the board must 
show that “the directors have not acted out of sole or primary purpose to entrench 
themselves in office”).
22) Id. at 955 (The mechanism must be “designed to ensure that a defensive measure to 
thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of 
the corporation and its stockholders, which in all circumstances must be free of any fraud 
or other misconduct”).
23) Id. at 955. 
24) Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
25) Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
26) Id. at 1387.
27) Id. at 1388.
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long as a proxy contest remains a viable alternative for attaining the 
acquirer’s goals. If the defensive mechanism is neither coercive nor 
preclusive, the court needs to assess whether the mechanism is within the 
“range of reasonableness.”28) 
In applying this two-prong standard in Unocal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court found that the threat posed by Mesa was reasonable because Mesa’s 
bid was a grossly inadequate two-tier coercive tender offer coupled with 
the threat of greenmail.29) The court expressed the flexibility of the decision 
and the lack of a definitive blueprint to follow in fashioning the satisfaction 
of the Unocal prongs.30) As a final note, the Unocal court provided an 
alternative means of ensuring shareholder rights by stating that “[i]f the 
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, 
the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board 
out.”31) 
Revlon v. MacAndrews32) validated the poison pill as a response to a 
specific threat in addition to a valid pre-planning strategy. The outcome of 
Revlon allowed boards to adopt poison pills to protect against offers the 
board believed to be inadequate. The ongoing use of the poison pill would 
still be required to meet the Unocal proportionality test—both when used as 
a pre-planning tool and a responsive one. The first Delaware case to 
approve flip-in poison pills was Stahl v. Apple Bancorp33) in 1990. Flip-in pills 
have faced tougher scrutiny, as they are capable of diluting the bidder’s 
holdings of the target, thereby deterring takeovers altogether. The court 
ruled that when a rights plan excludes proxies obtained through public 
solicitation from the definition of beneficial ownership, shareholders’ 
voting rights are not infringed upon since they are free to solicit proxies to 
28) Id. at 1387-88. 
29) Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (The court explicitly references Mesa’s “national reputation 
as a greenmailer”).
30) Id. at 957 (“[Corporate law] must grow and develop in response to, indeed in 
anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs . . . More recently, as the sophistication of both 
raiders and targets has developed, a host of other defensive measures to counter such ever 
mounting threats has evolved and received judicial sanction”).
31) Id. at 959, citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
32) Revlon v. MacAndrews, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
33) Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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remove the board. Several courts have used Unocal’s heightened scrutiny 
test to examine whether a flip-in pill is an overreaction to a takeover 
threat.34)
Grand Metropolitan v. Pillsbury35) and City Capital Associates v. Interco36) 
cast doubt on the usefulness of the poison pill as a takeover defense, 
offering fact-specific applications of Unocal proportionality. In both cases, 
the court issued a preliminary injunction against the ongoing use of the 
poison pill to prevent the completion of a hostile tender offer. More recent 
cases, such as In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholder’s Litigation,37) have 
demonstrated that when the factual circumstances do not lead the court to 
find that the poison pill fails the Unocal proportionality test, the poison pill 
may be allowed to remain in place to enable the board to conduct an 
auction or seek a white knight. 
When Oracle launched a hostile bid for PeopleSoft, Inc. in 2003, the 
Delaware court was faced with another poison pill that was adopted in the 
midst of a hostile takeover battle. The pill was only a part of the elaborate 
set of defenses the PeopleSoft board put in place, and many scholars 
expected the court to force PeopleSoft to redeem the poison pill for failing 
the cognizable threat element of Unocal. Delaware courts have found that 
structural coercion (two-tiered offers with less appealing consideration 
offered in the second tier) and substantive coercion (shareholders tendering 
without being fully informed) are the two primary threats. However, in 
34) Delaware courts have looked disfavorably on certain iterations of the poison pill—
notably, the “dead hand” and “no hand” varieties—which would allow directors to limit 
or control when a pill could be redeemed even after they have left the board. In Carmody v. 
Toll Brothers, 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998), the court cast serious doubt on the legality of 
dead hand pills, on the grounds that they would violate Delaware statutes vesting voting 
power in the entire board and requiring that the current board have the power and 
authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. The court also found the 
dead hand poison pill to be a breach of fiduciary duty under the Unocal-Unitrin standard. 
In Quickturn Design Systems v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998), the court condemned the 
use of no hand pills (those which cannot be removed by any newly elected director for a 
specified period) altogether. The court based its decision on the same factors that led to the 
Toll Brothers holding that such a device deprives newly elected directors of the authority 
vested in them by statute, and constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. 
35) Grand Metropolitan v. Pillsbury, 588 A.2d 1049 (Del. 1988).
36) City Capital Associates v. Interco, 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
37) In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholder’s Litigation, 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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PeopleSoft’s case, the offer was all cash and the shareholders had been 
given almost 16 months to consider the offer. The case ended in a 
settlement, but it nevertheless raised interesting corporate law questions. 
V.C. Strine refused to rule on the case until PeopleSoft made a final 
unconditional counteroffer, validating that in cases such as this, the target 
board cannot simply say no. 
Paramount Communications v. Time38) is another case that, despite not 
directly addressing rights plans, has had a significant impact on their use. 
The court characterized the risk that shareholders would erroneously 
perceive the underpriced offer as an attractive one as a reasonable threat to 
the corporation, thus allowing directors to use this possibility as grounds 
for putting a poison pill in place. The opinion also criticized the Delaware 
Chancery Court’s Interco decision as being colored by the court’s own 
valuation of a tender offer. The Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that 
the Unocal analysis must be based on the board’s valuation of the tender 
offer, not the court’s.
In addition to the case law that continues to build the framework for 
poison pill use, United States courts have also had to reconcile poison pills 
with tax and securities law.39)
38) Paramount Communications v. Time , 501 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
39) Recently, poison pills have been put to a new use: protecting Net Operating Losses 
(“NOLs”). Bolstered by the recent financial crisis, firms sustain losses that can be used as 
tax credits in following years. The advantages of NOLs can be reduced or eliminated if 
there is a change in beneficial ownership, meaning that companies with NOLs have an 
interest in preventing such a change in ownership before the tax advantages are realized. 
Additionally, depressed share prices make acquiring a company with a large NOL 
attractive and affordable. Poison pills with very low thresholds (4.99%) can protect these 
NOLs and also prevent a hostile bidder from acquiring a large stake. In Selectica v. Versata, 
No. 193, 2010 Del. LEXIS 506 (Del. Oct. 4, 2010), the potential acquirer intentionally 
triggered the NOL pill and then challenged the validity of the Selectica pill in the Delaware 
Chancery Court. The court held that the risk of losing an NOL was a sufficient threat under 
Unocal, and dismissed the challenge. The triggering of the pill provided new insight into 
the back-office mechanics of a poison pill, and may change the way companies adopt and 
redeem poison pills in the future. Another recent development is that many companies are 
including synthetic and derivative positions as triggers for their poison pills. In CSX Corp v. 
The Children’s Investment Fund Management, No. 08-2899-cv, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19788 
(N.Y.S. 2d Sept. 15, 2008), the court ruled that such synthetic and derivative positions 
constituted beneficial ownership under Section 31(d) of the Exchange Act. This ruling helps 
companies prevent hedge funds and other institutional investors from amassing large 
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2. Recent Shareholder Input
There is ongoing debate over whether a board’s ability to block a hostile 
bid with a poison pill benefits shareholders by empowering the board to 
negotiate for the best deal, or harms them by allowing the board to 
entrench itself. Most shareholder activists subscribe to the latter view; as a 
result, there have been continued attempts to restrain the board’s ability to 
unilaterally adopt a poison pill. 
To influence corporate policy, shareholder activists attempt to garner 
support for and vote in new by-laws. Without a by-law governing poison 
pills, they are governed either by board discretion or corporate policy. 
Corporate policies are not incorporated into the charter or by-laws, so the 
board may alter or remove policies at any time without seeking shareholder 
input. As of 2005, 78 companies had adopted poison pill policies.40) 
Although companies have historically abided by their poison pill policies, 
when it becomes advantageous for the board not to do so, there is nothing 
keeping the directors from abandoning the policy. As one quintessential 
example, News Corporation adopted a poison pill while negotiating its 
move from Australia to Delaware, but adopted a corporate policy stating 
that it and any future poison pill would expire within one year unless 
approved by shareholders. Despite this policy, the board adopted a two-
year poison pill shortly after completing the move. Shareholders in 
Australia, Britain, and the Netherlands brought suit against News 
Corporation for breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. News 
Corporation settled the lawsuit out of court, agreeing to put the poison pill 
to a vote and to allow shareholder input on poison pills for the next twenty 
years. The poison pill was approved shortly thereafter, receiving 57% of the 
shareholder vote.41) 
Proposing a by-law is generally accomplished by submitting a proposal 
to the board, and if it meets certain requirements the board must include 
the proposal in the annual proxy. However, the SEC altered its position on 
positions before launching a proxy contest. 
40) John Laide, Poison Pill Policy, SharkRepellent.net, Oct. 11, 2005.
41) News Corp. Vote Okays Poison Pill, sT. peTersBurg Times, Oct. 21, 2006, at 2D.
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poison pill by-law propositions in 2004, and began allowing corporations to 
exclude such propositions on the grounds that they had already been 
substantially implemented if the board has a poison pill policy.42) As a 
result, proposing such a by-law now requires one to mount their own 
proxy contest—a task that can be prohibitively expensive for even the 
largest shareholders of most public corporations. 
Shareholder activists often propose one of two types of poison pill 
by-laws. The first, similar to a chewable poison pill, would require the 
board to redeem the rights plan under certain circumstances where the 
price and terms of the proposed deal meet specified thresholds. The second 
common pill by-law requires shareholder approval for the adoption or 
renewal of any poison pill. However, questions remain about the legality of 
by-laws that limit the board’s power to conduct the business and affairs of 
the corporation—authority granted to the board by statute. The court came 
close to addressing this issue in General DataComm Industries v. State of 
Wisconsin Investment Board.43) At issue was a proposed by-law that would 
have prevented the board from re-pricing options without shareholder 
approval—addressing the issue of whether a by-law may be used to limit 
board authority head on. However, since it had merely been proposed, not 
passed, the court declined to decide the issue as it was not yet ripe.44)
One commentator suggests that two recent cases emphasize that 
Delaware courts will make an effort to construe charter and by-law 
provisions to support shareholders’ rights to nominate and vote for 
directors.45) In Jana Master Fund v. CNET Networks,46) the court held that the 
advance notice by-law for shareholder proposals is inapplicable to 
independently financed proxy solicitations. In the same year, Levitt Corp. v. 
42) Laide, supra note 40.
43) General DataComm Industries v. State of Wisconsin Investment Board, 731 A.2d 
818 (Del. Ch. 1999).
44) Brett McDonnell, Shareholder By-laws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 
BerKeley Bus. L.J. 205, 232 (2005).
45) Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, Renewed Focus on Takeover Defenses: 
Re-Tooling Advance Notice By-laws and the Return of the Stockholder Rights Plan, 2 ClienT alerT 
(Jan. 9, 2009).
46) Jana Master Fund v. CNET Networks , 947 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2008).
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Office Depot47) held that the advance notice requirement for director 
nomination would not apply to shareholder candidate proposals after the 
directors had filed the company’s proxy materials. Rather, the shareholders 
could effectively piggyback on the notice given by the board. This was due 
to an Office Depot by-law (albeit an ambiguous by-law) regulating the 
business at annual meetings by requiring the advance notice of shareholder 
proposals. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Flemming Companies,48) decided 
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, directly addresses the legality of poison 
pill by-laws. The issue arose when shareholders passed a resolution to 
remove the existing poison pill. When this resolution was ignored by the 
board, the shareholders prepared a proxy statement for inclusion in the 
proxy materials for the next annual meeting. The board initially refused to 
include it, but was forced to once the issue made its way through the court. 
The by-law proposal passed with 60% of the vote, upon which the directors 
claimed that this was an improper limitation of their authority. The relevant 
Oklahoma statutes49) are very similar in language to the comparable 
Delaware statutes, and the court ruled the by-law to be valid. 
A 2010 case making its way through the Delaware Chancery Court, 
Yucaipa v. Barnes & Noble,50) demonstrates that a board’s ability to 
unilaterally adopt a poison pill will likely remain safe. Applying Unocal, the 
court found that adoption of a pill in response to billionaire investor Ron 
Burkle’s accumulation of a significant stake in Barnes & Noble was a 
reasonable reaction to the threat posed. The court noted two factors that 
made the pill neither coercive nor preclusive: (1) Yucaipa could still launch 
a proxy contest to gain control of the company and (2) the poison pill was 
scheduled to be put to a shareholder vote in the near future. 
RiskMetrics Group (“RMG”), a leading provider of shareholder voting 
recommendations, has played a significant role in forcing the evolution of 
47) Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, No. 3622-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
14, 2008).
48) International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Flemming Companies, 975 P.2d 907 
(Okla. 1999).
49) McDonnell, supra note 44, at 228.
50) Yucaipa v. Barnes & Noble, 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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the poison pill into a more shareholder-friendly device. Since 2005, RMG 
has recommended the removal (by withholding votes) of directors at 
companies that adopt or renew pills without shareholder approval or a 
commitment to put the pill to a shareholder vote within twelve months, 
except where the board acted unilaterally to meet its fiduciary duty.51) RMG 
also advocated sunset provisions that took effect in 36 months or less 
(believing the ten-year pills to be harmful to shareholders), as well as 
shareholder redemption provisions, a trigger of no less than 20%, chewable 
features, and the absence of any dead hand or no hand features. Initially, 
the response was unimpressive. In 2005, less than 5% of the companies that 
adopted poison pills committed to putting the pill to a vote.52) Over time, 
however, the policies have begun to have a stronger effect. In 2009, 27% of 
the companies that adopted pills committed to putting them to shareholder 
votes. Notably, RMG’s policies have helped to shorten the average duration 
of poison pills. In 2009, 43% of them had a duration of five years or less. In 
2003, only 3% had a duration of five years or less.53) The increased effect of 
the policies has a number of possible explanations, one of which is that 
companies are increasingly switching from a plurality to a majority voting 
standard for director elections, meaning shareholders can actively vote out 
directors, rather than relying on mandatory resignation policies.
The important takeaway is that poison pills and activist shareholders 
can coexist. Since the first year of RMG’s policy (2005), 40 pill ratification 
proposals have been put to the shareholders (32 of which have been 
decided); of those, 23 passed and 9 failed. Twelve proposals met all of 
RMG’s shareholder friendly criteria; of those, 11 passed.54) Additionally, 4 
NOL poison pills have been proposed, all of which were approved by the 
shareholders, and on average received almost 90% of the vote.55) 
Widespread compliance with RMG’s policies is unlikely. Just as some 
activist shareholders believe that no pill should ever be adopted without 
51) John Laide, A New Era in Poison Pills - Specific Purpose Poison Pills, SharkRepellent.
net, Apr. 1, 2010.
52) Id. 
53) Id. 
54) John Laide, Shareholder Input on Poison Pills, SharkRepellent.net, Jun. 15, 2009.
55) Id.
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shareholder approval, many boards and board advisors believe that RMG’s 
policies water down the poison pill enough that it may not be able to 
accomplish the task for which it was designed.56)
Many corporate law scholars regard the battle against poison pills as 
largely over.57) Shareholder activists have set their sights on other corporate 
governance issues, such as classified boards and executive compensation. 
In 2003, there were almost 100 proposals mounted against poison pills; in 
2005, that number had fallen to 44, and by 2008 it was down to 8.58) 
However, the past two years have seen a spike in poison pill use, which can 
be attributed to at least three factors. First, 1999 was a landmark year for 
poison pills—most of which had a ten-year sunset provision, meaning that 
in 2009, boards had to decide whether to renew, revise, or abandon their 
rights plans. Second, the recent financial crisis has caused a sharp drop in 
the market capitalization of many companies, leaving their directors and 
officers concerned about the prospect of a hostile bidder in search of a deal. 
Third, poison pills have found a new role in corporate law—protecting 
NOLs, as discussed above. The reemergence of poison pills may also be 
explained by the absence of aggressive shareholder activism, and the fact 
that the poison pills being enacted now contain more shareholder-friendly 
features than they once did.
3. Observations 
The Delaware court’s work as policeman of the takeover defense has 
provided an extensive set of rules and standards, but it also serves as a 
constant reminder of the ongoing challenges that arise from the poison 
pill’s amorphous nature. As Gilson points out, decades after the question 
was first asked, it is still unclear whether a target board may block an offer 
over contrarian shareholder voices on the grounds that the offer does not 
measure up to the target’s fundamental value.59) The progression of case 
56) Id.
57) John Laide, Rethinking the Role of the Poison Pill, SharkRepellent.net, Sept. 17, 2008.
58) Id; John Laide, Trend Towards Removing Takeover Defenses Continues, SharkRepellent.
net, Jan. 17, 2006.
59) Gilson, supra note 7, at 39.
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law has also caused the pill to evolve into a negotiating tool for obtaining 
the best share price, rather than simply for blocking hostile bids.60)
Institutional investors, such as CalPERS, have taken advantage of their 
strong influence over boards and management teams to promote better and 
more transparent corporate governance. Independent directors serve as an 
additional guard against entrenchment. Essentially a creation of the court 
system, independent director safe harbors now operate as a substantial 
hurdle to the self-interested use of the poison pill. The New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”) raised the independent director standards and 
instituted various other transparency and governance-focused 
requirements. Since the NYSE and its sister exchanges are the doorkeepers 
of the largest pool of capital available to corporations, they are able to 
command companies’ attention and compliance in a way that even the 
court system cannot. 
IV. The Poison Pill in Japan
1. Overview61)
Japan introduced its poison pill in 2005, and within two years almost 
10% of the 4,000 companies listed on the national stock exchanges had 
incorporated poison pills into their defense strategies.62) The most important 
development is the Japanese High Court’s seminal decision in the Bulldog 
case in 2007. Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (“Steel Partners”), a 
foreign hostile acquirer, filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to 
invalidate Bulldog Sauce Company’s (“Bulldog’s”) poison pill, but the 
motion was denied on the grounds that 1) the principle of equal treatment 
60) Id. at 33.
61) See Satoshi Kawai, Poison Pill in Japan, 2004 Colum. Bus. l. rev. 11; Ronald J. Gilson, 
The Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, 2004 Colum. Bus. l. rev. 21; William B. 
Chandler III, Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: A Judicial Perspective, 2004 Colum. Bus. 
l. rev. 45; Hideki Kanda, Does Corporate Law Really Matter in Hostile Takeovers?: Commenting 
on Professor Gilson and Chancellor Chandler, 2004 Colum. Bus. l. rev. 67.
62) Osugi, Kenichi, What is Converging?: Rules on Hostile Takeovers in Japan and the 
Convergence Debate, 9 asian-paCifiC l. & poliCy J. 143, 158 (2007).
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of shareholders had not been violated, and 2) Steel Partners had failed to 
show its management plan or its proposed exit strategy.63) The court 
interpreted majority shareholder support as being indicative of a legitimate 
purpose, and since Bulldog made Steel Partners a reasonable offer for its 
stake and warrants, the action was not considered draconian.64) The High 
Court affirmed the appeal, using the altered reasoning that since Steel 
Partners had no intention of managing Bulldog post-acquisition, it was an 
“abusive acquirer.” The High Court added that shareholder approval 
caused the action to fall within the range of reasonableness.65)
As alluded to by the Bulldog decision, the Japanese courts appear as if 
they will be the leading entity policing the Japanese poison pill. The 
Japanese Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (“METI”) taskforce on takeover defenses in Japan explicitly 
deemed Delaware takeover jurisprudence as a fitting set of guiding 
principles,66) and the language from the Bulldog case illustrates that the 
court borrowed Unocal and Unitrin reasoning in formulating the decision.67) 
Scholarly opinion praises the work of the courts thus far; in the face of such 
a daunting challenge, they appear to be performing quite well.68) 
There were a number of complementary forces that served to limit the 
use of the poison pill in the United States, and it is critical that equivalent 
forces come to bear in Japan. Unlike in the United States, directors in 
Japanese corporations face a much lower bar to be deemed independent 
(“outside directors”),69) so the independent committee is of limited usefulness 
in stopping self-dealing transactions. The Tokyo Stock Exchange (“TSE”) is 
likely the best entity to address this problem. By adopting stricter listing 
standards, the independence requirement could be brought in line with the 
63) Id. at 159.
64) Id.
65) Id.
66) But see Bernard Black, The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors, asia Bus. l. rev. 
3, 27 (July 2001) (“[I] would not wish for another country to copy our confused case law”).
67) Curtis Milhaupt, Is the Poison Pill Good for Japan?: A Preliminary Analysis of the New 
Takeover Guidelines, RIETI, July 28, 2005, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/05072801.
html.
68) Id.
69) Gilson, supra note 7, at 41. 
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Delaware court’s definition,70) which would ease the pressure on Japanese 
courts by preempting litigation. Institutional investors should also play a 
role, but they are more suited to follow than lead; the establishment of 
strong corporate governance standards empowers institutional investors to 
pressure management to comply with those standards. 
One positive development unique to Japan is the 2006 Company Law 
Amendments requiring corporations to annually disclose their contemplated 
defensive measures and to include a statement from the board that the 
measures are in the common interest of all shareholders and do not serve 
an entrenchment purpose.71) The TSE followed suit, and now requires listed 
companies to comply with similar disclosure regulations when issuing the 
rights underlying a poison pill. The TSE also reserves the power to delist 
companies that abuse the takeover defense.72) However, Japan is also facing 
a unique problem in that complaints (although mostly from foreign 
investors) have been voiced about the current proxy system. Many feel that 
it offers too short a timeframe for proxy voting and that the process is 
subject to abuse because of limited auditing requirements.73) 
Building the regulatory infrastructure and correctly incentivizing these 
private parties to participate is a long-term process. In the mean time, 
shareholders must be willing to take proactive steps to protect their rights. 
The courts are proving themselves capable of handling the growing pains 
these changes are causing, but this requires shareholders to be willing to 
sue when they feel that management is going too far in adopting defensive 
techniques.74)
2. The Bulldog Sauce Case
Just three years ago when someone mentioned Bulldog sauce, all that 
came to mind was the famous and beloved tonkatsu sauce found in every 
70) Milhaupt, supra note 67.
71) Bliss B. Pak, National Markets and New Defenses, The Case for an East-Asian Opt-in 
Takeover Law, 20 Colum. J. asian l. 385, 405 (2007).
72) Id.
73) Milhaupt, supra note 67.
74) Id.
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Japanese kitchen. Today, lawyers and businesspeople associate Bulldog 
sauce with an infamous hostile takeover attempt that had a major impact 
on Japanese corporate law. By ruling that the poison pill implemented by 
Bulldog against hostile bidder Steel Partners was valid, the Supreme Court 
of Japan raised questions about the legality of defense mechanisms and the 
standards that would be used to evaluate their validity. Despite the strong 
public sentiment and media attention surrounding the case, we suggest 
that there is no use crying over spilled Bulldog sauce.
Some critics believe that the Bulldog case was decided incorrectly. Most 
importantly, as mentioned above, the holding has complicated 
practitioners’ ability to determine the legal standard to apply to defensive 
mechanisms. The decision has also caused concern among foreign investors 
who view the Bulldog holding as confirmation of Japan’s protectionist 
attitude regarding foreign investors. Despite these critiques, many believe 
the Bulldog case lays the foundation for solidifying Japan’s corporate law 
with respect to hostile takeovers and defensive mechanisms. Arguably, the 
Bulldog decision75) is Japan’s Unocal. 
1) Factual Background
In May 2007, Steel Partners launched a takeover bid for Bulldog, 
offering 1,584 yen for each outstanding share (later raised to 1,700 yen per 
share, reflecting a premium of 18.56%). The move was executed through a 
special purpose vehicle of Steel Partners, which already held 10.25% of the 
issued shares. 
In response to questions posed by Bulldog regarding Steel Partners’ 
75) There are three translations available for the Supreme Court decision of the Bulldog 
case:
a. Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, 
Aug. 7, 2007, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/
text/2007.08.07-2007.-Kyo-.No.30.html (From the Supreme Court of Japan website).
b. Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, 
Aug. 7, 2007, available at http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/rlr26/case.
pdf. 
c. Nels Hansen, Japan’s First Poison Pill Case, Bulldog Sauce v. Steel Partners: A 
Comparative and Institutional Analysis, 26 zeiTsChrifT für JapanisChes reChT [J. Japan 
l.] 139, 145-54 (2008). 
 Importing Hazardous Substances from the United States?   |  21No. 1: 2010
post-aquisition plan for the company, Steel Partners made the following 
acknowledgements regarding its past history and its intentions for Bulldog:
a. Steel Partners has never managed a company in Japan nor does it 
have any plan to do so at present, including Bulldog;
b.  Steel Partners has no intention of managing Bulldog;
c.  Steel Partners has not thought about the way to present 
proposals regarding the means to improve corporate value to the 
management; 
d.  Steel Partners has no business plan or management plan for the 
time when it takes over control of Bulldog; and
e.  As there is no intention on the part of Steel Partners to manage 
the daily business of Bulldog, Steel Partners does not feel that it is 
necessary to respond to questions regarding the production and 
sales business of Bulldog.76)
Further, Steel Partners gave no indication of how the investment would 
be recovered.77) These responses by Steel Partners led Bulldog’s board of 
directors to determine that the takeover bid would “harm the corporate 
value of [Bulldog] and the common interests of shareholders.”78)
In response to the hostile bid, Bulldog’s board proposed a plan for the 
allotment of rights to purchase new shares without consideration 
(“Gratuitous Allocation of Share Options”).79) Steel Partners representatives 
76) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, 
Aug. 7, 2007, at §2(5).
77) Id.
78) Id.
79) As noted on the website of the Supreme Court of Japan, the poison pill was 
structured as follows:
a. Steel Partners would issue three rights to all shareholders to purchase new shares 
per existing share;
b. The consideration to be paid by a shareholder for the issue of an ordinary share by 
Steel Partners on the exercise of a right would be 1 yen per share;
c. Bulldog and its affiliates, including Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund—a wholly 
owned special purpose vehicle of Steel Partners used to purchase shares for 
Bulldog—would not be entitled to exercise their right to purchase new shares; and
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were present at the general shareholders’ meeting in June 2007, and voted 
Steel Partners’ Bulldog shares.80) The plan was approved, receiving 88.7% of 
present shareholders’ votes and 83.4% of the total votes.81) After the 
proposal’s approval, the board decided that Bulldog would acquire all the 
rights of Steel Partners and its affiliates for 396 yen per right—without 
causing any tax liability. Upon the implementation of the defense 
mechanism, Steel Partners’ holdings fell from 10.25% to about 3% of 
Bulldog.82) As compensation under the Gratuitous Allocation of Share 
Options plan, Steel Partners would receive just over 2.3 billion yen in 
consideration of issued stock acquisition rights, calculated based on the 
tender offer price.
2) Legal Application
The Bulldog case focuses on the equal treatment of shareholders 
principle, which is codified in Article 109-1 of the Japanese Company Act.83) 
It stipulates that “[a] stock company shall treat its shareholders equally in 
accordance with the features and number of the shares they hold.” 
However, a caveat exists: if there is a risk that the acquisition of manage-
ment control by a particular shareholder would harm the company’s 
interest or the common interests of the shareholders, discriminatory 
treatment against this threatening shareholder aimed at preventing such 
acquisition is not a violation of the equal treatment of shareholders principle 
d. Bulldog may acquire Steel Partners’ rights to purchase new shares by paying Steel 
Partners and its affiliates for 396 yen per right (one quarter of Steel Partners’ 
original tender offer price). 
Id. at §2(6). 
80) Id. (At the general shareholders' meeting, Steel Partners “merely asked questions 
about the content of the defensive measure vis a vis the TOB, the total cost involving its 
implementation, whether or not tax liability emerges if the measure is to be implemented, 
the projected response of the counter party if the TOB is withdrawn and another attempt of 
takeover via a takeover bid is made”). 
81) Id.
82) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, 
Aug. 7, 2007, riTsumeiKan l. rev., at 254.
83) The Company Act, English Translation provided by Nagoya University, available at 
http://www.kl.i.is.nagoya-u.ac.jp/told/h17a08601en.2.1.txt (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
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unless the treatment is unreasonable or unfair.84) This caveat mimics the 
Unocal standard by looking first to the existence of a threat to the corporate 
value, then to the reasonableness of the defense mechanism. This standard 
is also parallel to the guidelines proposed by the METI, which establishes 
that the three principles governing countermeasures to hostile takeovers 
are: “1) the protection of corporate value and thus shareholders’ common 
interests; 2) prior disclosure and reflection of shareholders’ will; and 3) 
reasonability and necessity in response to the threat posed.”85)
Similar to the Unocal court, the Supreme Court of Japan found that 
Bulldog’s defensive measures were valid and would not be enjoined. The 
Supreme Court found that the first Unocal prong was satisfied because the 
Bulldog board reasonably determined that Steel Partners’ hostile bid 
presented an urgent situation that required that the board act defensively 
“in order to prevent damage to the corporate value of [Bulldog].”86) In order 
to assess the threat posed by the bidder, the directors must demonstrate 
that they acted in good faith, conducted a reasonable investigation, and 
acted without motive to entrench the management. The court noted that the 
board asked Steel Partners to inform them of its history of managing 
Japanese companies, its future business plan for Bulldog, and for its 
investment recovery strategy. The board claimed that the non-responsive 
answers to the aforementioned questions reasonably led to the conclusion 
that the takeover bid would harm Bulldog’s corporate value as well as the 
common interests of the shareholders.87) Additionally, similar to the Unocal 
court’s classification of Mesa’s reputation as a greenmailer as a threat, the 
Supreme Court in Bulldog noted that Steel Partners’ statements (and its 
84) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, 
Aug. 7, 2007, at §4(1)(b) (“[I]n cases where, by the taking of control of the company by a 
specific shareholder, the corporate value and the interest of the company, and ultimately 
the common interest of shareholders would be harmed, treating the above shareholder in a 
discriminatory manner in order to prevent this from happening is not immediately against 
the underlying idea of the principle of the equality of shareholders, unless it is against the 
idea of fairness and lacks reasonableness”).
85) Hansen, supra note 75, at 144.
86) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, 
Aug. 7, 2007, at §4(2).
87) Id. at §2(5).
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acquisition history) raised a cognizable threat of greenmail.88) 
The Bulldog court explicitly noted that the underlying motive of 
Bulldog’s board was not entrenchment, but enhancement of corporate 
value and advancement of shareholder interests. The rights plan, although 
it discriminated against Steel Partners, was not deployed to protect the 
company’s management or controlling shareholders:
If the Gratuitous Allocation of Share Options to shareholders 
with discriminatory contents is primarily intended for the 
maintenance of control by directors who are in charge of the 
management or shareholders who are supporting them, and not for 
the maintenance of the corporate value, and ultimately the common 
interest of shareholders, such gratuitous allocation of share options 
is, as a rule, regarded as extremely unfair means. It is evident from 
[the facts of this case] that the Gratuitous Allocation of Share 
Options does not fall in such cases.89) 
After finding that a legitimate threat existed, the Supreme Court next 
looked to whether the response was proportional and reasonable in relation 
to the threat posed by Steel Partners. One of the factors that is reviewed in 
determining the proportionality of the response to a hostile bidder’s threat 
is timing of the offer. In the Bulldog case, the court looked at the timing of 
Steel Partners’ hostile bid and noted that: 
[A]s a measure in response to an urgent situation in order to 
prevent damage to the corporate value of the counter party . . . when 
the [takeover bid] was suddenly initiated and the possibility of 
88) Konari Uchida & Peng Xu, U.S. Barbarians at the Japan Gate: Cross Border Hedge Fund 
Activism, BanK of Japan worKing paper series, 1 (Feb. 2008) (discussing Steel Partners’ 
history investing in over 30 companies in Japan since its entrance into Tokyo in 2002. After 
launching takeover bids against Sotoh Corporation, Yushiro Chemical, Sapporo Holdings, 
Myojo Foods and Tenryu Saw Manufacturing, most bids resulted in greenmail where the 
takeover bids failed, but Steel Partners sold the shares in exchange for large profits). It is 
also interesting to note here the uncanny parallel roles that are played by T. Boone Pickens 
in the Unocal case and Warren Lichtenstein in the Bulldog case.
89) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, 
Aug. 7, 2007, at §4(2).
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taking over control of the counter party by the Appellant and the 
Affiliates became real, . . . the Gratuitous Allocation of Share Options 
cannot be found to be by extremely unfair means.90)
Under the Unocal-Unitrin standard, the Gratuitous Allocation of Share 
Options was not “coercive” because it was approved by a shareholder vote. 
Further, Steel Partners participated in the general shareholders’ meeting, 
took part in the process by asking clarifying questions regarding the 
proposal, and voted on the proposal itself. With the high approval ratio of 
the shareholders (83.4%), this proposal cannot be deemed as a means of 
“cramming down a management-sponsored alternative on the 
shareholders.”91) Further, the defensive mechanism cannot be considered 
“preclusive” because the takeover process was not made “mathematically 
impossible or realistically unattainable,”92) strictly due to the Gratuitous 
Allocation of Share Options in it of itself; rather, it became impossible only 
after the shareholders’ vote. 
After finding the defensive mechanism to be neither coercive nor 
preclusive, the court assessed whether the mechanism fell within the range 
of reasonableness.93) 
The court found two main reasons that the Gratuitous Allocation of 
Share Options was not an unreasonable response to the threat and thus not 
a violation of Article 109-1 of the Company Act. First, the court noted that 
Steel Partners had the opportunity to express its opinion at the general 
shareholders’ meeting and vote on the process. Second, Steel Partners was 
able to receive compensation that approximated the value of stock warrants. 
The final issue considered by the Supreme Court was the timing of the 
implementation of the Gratuitous Allocation of Share Options. Article 247 
of the Company Act94) questions whether the discriminatory plan was put 
90) Id. 
91) Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387. 
92) Id. at 1388.
93) Id. at 1387-88. 
94) Article 247 of the Company Act states:
In the following cases, if shareholders are likely to suffer any disadvantage, 
shareholders may demand that the Stock Company discontinue an issue of the Share 
Options relating to solicitation under Article 238(1):
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in place in response to the hostile bid, not prior to it.95) The decision states: 
[I]f the problem of whether defensive measures against an 
attempt to take over control of the company would be adopted or 
not, and if they are to be adopted, their content, are determined in 
advance of such an attempt, it would increase the foreseeability of 
shareholders, investors, acquirers etc. In fact, there are increasing 
numbers of cases providing for such measures in advance. However, 
the absence of such advance rules does not in itself mean that adoption of 
defensive measures is impermissible at the time the attempt of taking over 
control has started.96) 
Thus, the fact that the takeover defense plan was not laid out by 
management prior to the takeover attempt does not make the defensive 
measure a per se violation of Japanese corporate law, which follows closely 
with Delaware law.97) 
3. Questions That Remain After the Bulldog Sauce Case
There is a clear parallel between the Unocal and the Bulldog decisions. 
However, it remains unclear what conditions must be met to receive the 
court’s approval of defense mechanisms after the Bulldog decision. This 
section analizes three potential requirements addressed in the Bulldog 
(i) In cases where such Share Option issue violates the applicable laws and 
regulations or articles of incorporation; or
(ii) In cases where such Share Option issue is effected by using a method that is 
extremely unfair.
The Company Act, English Translation provided by Nagoya University, §247.
95) Id. at §247(ii).
96) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, 
Aug. 7, 2007, at §4(2) (emphasis added).
97) It is interesting to note that the overwhelming majority of poison pills are of the 
pre-warning variety. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bulldog Sauce for the Japanese Soul? Courts, 
Corporations, and Communities - A Comment on Haley’s View of Japanese Law, 8 wash. u. 
gloBal sTud. l. rev. 345, 352 (2009) (Table 1 shows that as of July 2006, of the companies 
with defensive measures, 93.5% had pre-warning type defenses, and as of July 2007, 97.4% 
had pre-warning type defenses).
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opinion and the problems that these requirements raise. 
1) Shareholder Approval 
Despite the similarities between Unocal and Bulldog, the Japanese system 
is exceptional because the shareholders are the players that ultimately 
decide whether an acquisition harms their common interests. The Bulldog 
opinion states that the decision rests with the “shareholders themselves, to 
whom the company’s interests ultimately inure, and that decision should 
be respected unless the general shareholders’ meeting was procedurally 
unfair, the facts upon which the decision was predicated prove to be 
nonexistent or false, or there is some other important fault that renders the 
decision unjustified.”98) A June 30, 2008 report issued by METI (the “2008 
Report”) prescribing the code of conduct for directors further established 
the weight placed on shareholder input.99) The emphasis put on shareholder 
approval in Bulldog also perpetuated the mistaken belief that procuring a 
certain percentage of management-friendly shareholder votes will provide 
a bullet-proof takeover defense for future corporations planning on 
implementing defense measures against hostile takeovers. Following the 
Supreme Court’s decision, companies came to believe that maintaining at 
least 50% of voting shares in friendly hands is the best way to avoid hostile 
takeovers, either through cross-holdings or employee ownership. This 
belief has led to a revival of cross-shareholding among Japanese companies. 
Crossholdings jumped from 11.1% of all listed shares in March 2005 to 
12.3% by the end of March 2008.100)
98) “Unless there is a material flaw which deprives the legitimacy of the decision of 
shareholders such as the flaw in the procedure of the general shareholders’ meeting or the 
facts which served as the basis of shareholders’ decision did not actually exist, or was false, 
the shareholders’ decision should be respected.” Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 2007 (Kyo) No. 
30, Minshu Vol. 61 No. 5, Bulldog Sauce, Aug. 7, 2007, at §4(1)(b).
99) Corporate Value Study Group, Takeover Defense Measures in Light of Recent 
Environmental Changes, minisTry of Trade, eConomy and indusTry of Japan, 7-8 (Jun. 30, 
2008). Section (3)(1) emphasizes the board’s responsibility by consistently referring to the 
need to consider, enhance, and contribute to shareholder interests in 6 of the 8 codes of 
conduct for the directors in the face of a takeover bid. 
100) Ken Kiyohara, Jotaro Yokoyama & Scott Jones, Recent Developments in Takeover 
Defense Discussions in Japan, Jones day puBliCaTions (Sept. 2008); Milhaupt, supra note 97, at 
359.
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The importance of shareholder approval of takeover defenses is 
illustrated by comparing Bulldog with Livedoor v. NBS,101) a case in which the 
Tokyo District Court and High Court enjoined NBS from diluting 
Livedoor’s stake in NBS by issuing warrants to management-friendly 
parties in order to maintain control.102) The difference between the NBS case 
and the Bulldog case is that in NBS, defense mechanisms were unilaterally 
instated by a resolution of the board without a shareholder vote. The NBS 
court held that new warrants may only be issued under special 
circumstances to protect the common interests of the shareholders. The 
Tokyo High Court said that a board of directors would still be acting 
appropriately if the bidder were an “abusive acquirer.”103) 
Bulldog was not meant to create a “just say no” standard based strictly 
on a shareholder vote.104) The Supreme Court will not deem a corporation 
fully invulnerable from hostile bidders simply because it has a majority of 
friendly shareholders and an ex ante rights plan affirmed by the 
shareholders. However, reliance strictly on shareholder approval does have 
the negative effect of skewing the incentives of shareholders, leading them 
to dispose of their shares before the record date because they have no 
vested interest in the outcome of the meeting. Such a lack of accountability 
and disregard for minority shareholders could not have been the intention 
of the Supreme Court.
Another question that the Bulldog case leaves open is how to weigh the 
importance of shareholder input in cases where the board plays a 
paternalistic role by protecting corporate value that is not evident to 
shareholders. This is where the similarities between the Delaware and 
Japanese court decisions end. There are numerous Delaware cases that 
permit the board of target corporations to create defense mechanisms 
101) Nippon K.K. v. Raibudoa K.K., 1173 Hanrei Taimuzu 125 (Tokyo Koto Saibansho 
[Tokyo High Ct.], Mar. 23, 2005); See CurTis J. milhaupT & KaTharina pisTor, law and 
CapiTalism: whaT CorporaTe Crises reveal aBouT legal sysTems and eConomiC developmenT 
around The world 87-107 (2008).
102) Cristina Alger, The Livedoor Looking Glass: Examining the Limits of Hostile Takeover 
Bids in Japan, 3 nyu J. l. & Bus. 309, 319-21 (2007).
103) Id.
104) See supra Section IV(2)(2) for a discussion of the considerations that went into the 
Bulldog opinion.
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against hostile bidders without consulting the shareholders. One example 
of this protectionist approach is seen in Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer 
Services.105) In Moore, the District Court of Delaware found that the defensive 
mechanisms put in place against the hostile bidder were not redeemed 
because the board reasonably believed that the shareholders’ lack of 
information about the long-term benefits of their investment would cloud 
their judgment and lead to an inadequate price offering only a small short-
term gain.106) How will the Japanese courts balance the deference to boards’ 
business judgment and the protection of shareholders’ interests?
2) Compensation for Potential Acquirers
The Bulldog case has also been criticized for its potential to encourage 
greenmailing. One of the reasons the Supreme Court found the Gratuitous 
Allocation of Share Options to be a reasonable and proportional response to 
Steel Partners was the compensation that Steel Partners received. Although 
it is rational to consider whether the hostile bidder suffered financial harm, 
the holding simultaneously seems to approve of greenmailing. Advance-
warning type defensive measures such as the poison pill signal to 
corporations that they should provide the target company’s management 
with the time and information necessary to adequately inform its 
shareholders about the potential purchase, and to do so before making a 
large purchase of shares. If the potential purchaser fails to comply (as Steel 
Partners did here), the management may use defensive countermeasures 
that could cause extensive monetary damage to the acquirer. The threat of 
such damage acts as a deterrent and compels the acquirer to work with the 
management. However, if the acquirer is determined to take control of the 
company, these barriers will sometimes be insufficient to force the acquirer 
to negotiate with the board.
The ruling also may send the wrong message to business executives by 
105) Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Services, 907 F. Supp. 1545 (Dist. Ct. Del. 1995).
106) Id. at 1560-61 (“Therefore, Moore's tender offer poses a threat that shareholders 
might tender their shares without appreciating the fact that after substantial capital 
investment, Wallace is actually witnessing the beginning of the pay-off of its business 
strategy. The Court therefore finds that Moore's tender offer poses a threat to Wallace that 
shareholders, because they are uninformed, will cash out before realizing the fruits of the 
substantial technological innovations achieved by Wallace”).
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leading them to believe that they can pay off unsolicited acquirers. As 
evidence that this perception is taking hold in the boardroom, the statistics 
after the Bulldog decision show an increase in defensive measures that 
stipulate monetary payoff to unsolicited acquirers. It was estimated that, as 
of July 2008, around 21.4% of all takeover-defensive measures (39.5% of 
defensive measures newly adopted in that year) stipulated to the option of 
making a payment of money to unsolicited acquirers.107)
3) Proxy Battles
When considering the standards set by the Unitrin-Unocal decisions, 
American legal practitioners and judges must always think about the 
availability of proxy fights. The second prong of the Unitrin-Unocal 
proportionality test requires that the defense mechanism not be preclusive. 
Unitrin has clearly established that takeover defenses cannot be deemed 
preclusive as long as a proxy contest remains a viable alternative for 
attaining the acquirer’s goals, regardless of the difficulty and expense 
associated with this process. This section looks at the prevalence and 
effectiveness of proxy fights in Japan. 
Thus far, proxy fights have been rare in Japan, and uncertainty remains 
regarding regulations and practice.108) However, recently, there has been a 
small number of cases in which shareholders were able to mount successful 
objections to company business plans using proxy fights. Notable cases 
include Tokyo Kohtetsu Co., Ltd., the first Japanese case which saw 
shareholders successfully veto a merger approved by both company 
boards. In February 2007, a proposal for Tokyo Kohtetsu to become a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Osaka Steel Co. Ltd. through a share exchange 
was rejected by the shareholders because Ichigo Asset Management 
International Pte. Ltd. initiated a proxy fight to object to the share exchange 
on the grounds that it failed to fully reflect the value of Tokyo Kohtetsu.109) 
Similarly, a CFS Corporation merger proposal was rejected through a proxy 
fight. In October 2007, CFS’s proposal to establish a new holding company 
107) Shintaro Takai & Keiji Tonomura, Hostile Takeover Defense Measures, inTl. fin. l.r.: 
guide To Japan 2009 (2008). 
108) Id. 
109) Reuters, A First in Japan: Shareholders Block a Takeover, n.y. Times, Feb. 22, 2007. 
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with Ain Pharmaciez Inc. through various share transfers to merge their 
business operations failed because the largest shareholder of CFS, Aeon 
Co., Ltd. initiated a proxy fight on the grounds that the exchange ratio for 
the merger was disadvantageous for CFS.110) Tokyo Electron is the third 
case in which shareholders successfully refused to support the board’s 
proposal. Similar to the two cases preceding it, this case reflects the 
growing ability of shareholders to reject management’s business plan.111)
The shareholder power derived from proxy fights extends beyond the 
ability to trump management business plans, and reaches to thwart 
management appointments. At a May 2008 meeting of Aderans Holdings 
Co., dissatisfied shareholders successfully led other shareholders to reject 7 
of the 9 company sponsored reappointments to the board.112) The importance 
of this case lies in the fact that the shareholders were able to replace the 
management of a corporation through a proxy contest. This is of particular 
significance because of the Delaware standard that protective measures are 
not considered preclusive or coercive when shareholders are capable of 
removing the current management and redeeming defensive measures they 
have put in place. The success of these proxy fights illustrates Japanese 
shareholders’ growing scrutiny of management’s proposals, ensuring that 
corporate value and the promotion of shareholder interests continue to 
improve. 
The effectiveness of proxy fights in Japan will likely continue to 
improve shareholder activism and defense mechanism evaluation. This is 
especially true because proxy fights in Japan are more potent weapons 
against the poison pill than in the United States because Japanese corporate 
law does not permit staggered boards and allows removal of directors 
110) Taiga Uranaka, Japan’s Aeon to Double Stake in Drug Store Chain, reuTers, Mar. 17, 
2008. 
111) Douglas G. Gruener, Chilled to the Pill: The Japanese Judiciary’s Cool Reception of the 
Poison Pill and Potential Repercussions, 67 u. piTT. l. rev. 871, 874 (2006); Hansen, supra note 
75, at 169-70.
112) Tomoko Yamazaki & Shigeru Sato, TCI Loses More Than Face as Japan Says No to 
Foreigners Playing, BloomBerg, July 28, 2009. (“On May 28 [2008], Steel Partners won a rare 
victory, using its 27 percent ownership of Aderans Holdings Co., a Tokyo-based wigmaker, 
to install a new board to maintain control and block a rival bid. The move effectively 
prevented a 17.6 billion yen offer from a Japanese buyout fund, Unison Capital Inc., which 
the Aderans management had backed”).
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without cause.113) 
These questions are not clearly answered by the Bulldog case. Only 
further court decisions in future hostile takeover cases will resolve the 
ambiguities found in the current legal standards.
4) Observations
Although many scholars believe that the Japanese system is converging 
with the United States system, the reality is that this belief is somewhat 
overstated. As we have tried to demonstrate in this paper, the Bulldog case 
has raised more questions about the proper balance of shareholder 
empowerment, the proper compensation for potential acquirers, and the 
future role of proxy fights. However, as we look at the future of Japan and 
the convergence with Delaware’s framework,114) there should be little real 
concern about these questions. These are changing tides, and Japanese 
corporate law is being constantly refined and reevaluated by the courts. 
Similar to Delaware, the relevant case law at times offers mixed conclusions 
and the precedential case law is largely fact-dependent.115) Japan will face 
many more cases, which will raise questions that current precedent cannot 
answer, and the judges that face these cases must carefully craft answers 
with the aim of shaping the long-term direction of Japanese corporate 
law.116) As was the case in Germany, crafting a legal response to hostile 
takeovers touches deep chords of nationalism, protectionism, and fear of 
113) Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 
105 Colum. l. rev. 2171, 2202 (2005).
114) Id. at 2196 (demonstrating the incorporation of Delaware case law into the 2005 
METI Takeover Guidelines).
115) The case law and the decisions have been all over the map and no consistent 
bright line rule exists for defensive mechanisms in response to hostile takeover actions. 
This statement is no truer than in the context of defensive mechanisms and hostile 
takeovers. The case law that post-dated Unocal added numerous conditions and additional 
rules to be addressed, as evidenced by Unitrin. The addition of the Revlon and Omnicare 
duties further muddled the legal waters with respect to board duties in reaction to hostile 
takeover bids. As stated in Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989), 
“there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties.” This statement 
stands true for Unocal and Revlon duties.
116) The indeterminacy that plagues the Delaware courts will likely be more prevalent 
in Japan because Japanese judges lack formal training in business and finance. Milhaupt, 
supra note 97, at 358. 
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the unknown.117) Currently such fear is premature; hostile bids remain a 
largely immobilized strategy in Japan. Friendly takeovers are still the norm 
and Japan has yet to see a successful hostile takeover.118) Although there has 
been an increase in hostile takeover bids, this is different from the ex ante 
threat of hostile takeovers.119) As a further deterrent to aspiring corporate 
raiders, the recent imprisonment of Takafumi Horie and Yoshiaki 
Murakami—two of the most prominent shareholder activists in Japan—has 
had a chilling effect on Japan’s takeover market, especially the domestic 
market. 
The Commercial Code amendments and the METI Guidelines do not 
establish the total legal realm of the defensive mechanisms. The Takeover 
Guidelines in particular are only soft legal guidelines, and offer no certainty 
for determining the legally enforceable standards for defensive 
mechanisms. The job of establishing the standards and limitations of 
defensive mechanisms falls to the Japanese courts.120) Milhaupt is hopeful 
that “Japan will find its own equilibrium point in this process of shifting 
expectations as it fits Delaware takeover jurisprudence to the dictates of its 
own political economy.”121) Until hostile takeovers become more prevalent 
in Japan, additional case law will be sparse. In the meantime, it is important 
to understand the advantages hostile takeovers bring to markets and not 
fear such a development. Despite the questions raised and the disruptive 
side effects of the Bulldog case, the future is bright for Japanese corporate 
law and there is no use crying over spilled Bulldog sauce.
117) Milhaupt, supra note 113 at 2183; Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on 
Anti-Takeover Laws in the EU: The German Example, in reforming Company and TaKeover law 
in europe 541, 556 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004).
118) Dan W. Puchniak, Delusions of Hostility: The Marginal Role of Hostile Takeovers in 
Japanese Corporate Governance Remains Unchanged, 28 zeiTsChrifT für JapanisChes reChT [J. 
Japan l.] 89, 111 (2009).
119) Id. at 112.
120) Gilson, supra note 7, at 41; Milhaupt, supra note 97, at 357.
121) Milhaupt, supra note 113, at 2215.
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V. The Poison Pill in Korea
1. Corporate Governance Concerns
Korea is still debating the merits of adopting the poison pill. Strong 
voices have emerged on both sides of the issue, as touched on in the 
introduction. In the wake of a presidential promise to enact takeover 
defense legislation,122) supporters of the bill believe it will allow Korean 
firms to stop spending cash reserves fighting off hedge funds and 
greenmailers with expensive share buybacks,123) which would in turn free 
up finances to hire more workers, build new facilities and focus on long-
term growth and development. Controversially, the bill’s supporters also 
claim that secured managerial control will increase corporate investment.124) 
Opponents fear the poison pill could be viewed as discriminatory against 
foreign capital for its protectionist qualities.125) They also have concerns 
about how the pill will interact with the Chaebol system of control;126) many 
claim that it will further consolidate power, while paralyzing ongoing 
corporate governance reform and reducing transparency.127) Some people 
believe that the pill is a moral hazard because those currently in power will 
determine how and when the device will be implemented.128) These critics 
express concern regarding the stifling of foreign investments, and express 
that Korea’s unique corporate governance structure will not be able to 
integrate the anti-takeover provisions. The overwhelming sentiment of 
122) Lee, supra note 1.
123) Yu-ho Kim, Poison Pill, Korea Times, Mar. 18, 2010.
124) Id.
125) Id.
126) See Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein?: The Korean Chaebol’s Corporate 
Governance, 14 Cardozo J. inT’l & Comp. L. 21 (2006); James Jinho Chang & Hyun-Han Shin, 
Family Ownership and Performance in Korean Conglomerates, 15 paCifiC-Basin fin. J. 329 (2007); 
E. Han Kim & Woochan Kim, Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to Crisis, J. 
app. Corp. fin. 47 (2008); Hwa-Jin Kim, Toward the “Best Practice” Model in a Globalizing 
Market: Recent Developments in Korean Corporate Governance, 2 J. Corp. l. sTud. 345 (2002).
127) Eun-jung Kim, supra note 2; Woochan Kim, The Poison Pill Bill is Not in Perspective, 
Kyunghyang.com, Nov. 11, 2009 (Korean).
128) Yu-ho Kim, supra note 123.
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these individuals is that the costs will outweigh the benefits.129) If the pill 
were to be adopted in Korea, the key to efficiently utilizing the tool would 
be to implement other mechanisms to minimize the detrimental effects of 
the pill.130) 
Although heated debate can be interpreted as a sign of disorder, in this 
case,  the contrasting views are beneficial.  As long as the dissenting voices 
continue to monitor the effect of the poison pill after its adoption, these 
critics can act as the policemen to ensure the success of the pill in Korea by 
acting as a safeguard against abusive and inappropriate uses of the pill. 
In addition to proactive oversight, timing is an important consideration 
in determining how effective the poison pill will be. Korea can benefit from 
the introduction of the poison pill because Korea has been experiencing a 
sharp spike in hostile takeover bids, beginning with the Dongbu Group’s 
acquisition of Hannong Corporation in 1994. In the last decade, approximately 
three major hostile attempts have arisen each year, many for companies 
belonging to the most prominent corporate groups.131) There is no 
consensus on whether Korea’s hostile takeover activity is efficient. As 
discussed above, the desirability of free markets and secure managerial 
control for foreign investors is still uncertain. How the anti-takeover 
measures will impact ongoing Korean corporate governance reforms is also 
unclear. 
2. The Code
Under current Korean law, the United States incarnation of the poison 
pill is not legal. The KCC restricts dividend payouts to cash or stock, which 
prevents the issuance of the necessary rights, and shareholders play a 
controlling role in the form and timing of dividends, meaning a board of 
directors cannot unilaterally create the framework for a poison pill.132) The 
129) Id.
130) Id. 
131) Hwa-Jin Kim, The Case for Market for Corporate Control in Korea, 10 oxford u. Comp. 
l. forum 2, 229 (2009).
132) Id. at 268. This is also the case in many European countries. Davies & Hopt, supra 
note 4, at 239.
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Korean Ministry of Justice formed a working group in April 2008 and after 
two years of work, produced an 862 page report in March 2010.133) The 
following is a summary of some key proposed revisions to the KCC:
Article 432-2 would allow companies, by amendment to their articles of 
incorporation, to give shareholders the right to request the issuance of new 
shares which could be used in a shareholder rights plan. The proposed text 
of the article would limit the time period and exercise price, while also 
mandating that the new shares be issued in proportion to current 
ownership. The article also limits the use of these provisions to actions that 
would benefit all shareholders and maintain or increase the value of the 
company. Further, it provides for discriminatory issuance and redemption 
by granting the subscription options to only certain shareholders, limiting 
the ability to exercise the option, or offering different redemption terms to 
certain shareholders. This provision gives the pill its teeth, by allowing the 
company to use the subscription to dilute the holdings of certain 
shareholders. It would also preempt the disputes regarding the equal 
treatment of shareholders principle that took place in the Bulldog case.
Articles 432-3 and 432-4 would include transparency requirements that 
must be met if the subscription option is granted (which triggers the poison 
pill). Through resolution or public notice, the board must specify which 
shareholders will not receive the full benefits of the option, explain the 
reasons for the discriminatory action, and disclose information about the 
securities to be issued. Article 432-5 would prohibit the transfer of the pill 
separately from the shares. It also allows the free redemption of the pill 
through the resolution of board of directors or of the shareholders’ meeting.
While the final bill may look quite different than the current proposal, 
ministry officials stated that “the revision will . . . impose strict guidelines 
that prevent large shareholders seeking to protect their management 
control from abusing the system.”134) They even considered requiring two 
thirds of directors to vote in favor of the rights plan, although this idea has 
not been extensively pursued.135) The statutory inclusion of shareholder 
133) Korean minisTry of JusTiCe, proposal for an amendmenT of The CommerCial Code 
(suBsCripTion opTions): annoTaTions and minuTe of meeTings (Mar. 2010) (Korean).  
134) Eun-jung Kim, supra note 127.
135) Lee, supra note 1.
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approval in the bill is a strong indicator that Korea appreciates the potential 
destructive power of the pill and brings it to the forefront of the poison pill 
evolution as we see it in the United States and Japan.   
However, according to a recent empirical study using the Korea 
Exchange data, the stock market did not react negatively in March 2008 to 
the news that the Korean government (Ministry of Justice and Financial 
Supervisory Service) decided to introduce the poison pill.136) The study also 
found that the stock price of Chaebol firms did not show unusual movement 
upon the government’s announcement.137) It did not find that firms with 
higher foreign ownership showed stronger negative reaction to the news. 
The study concludes that the new takeover defense tool would not make 
the agency problems in Korean firms worse.138)  
3. Monitoring
The potential police for the Korean poison pill are similar to those doing 
the monitoring in the United States and Japan. The court system, 
government agencies, shareholder rights groups, institutional investors, 
and the national stock exchange are all possible overseers. 
Considering Japan’s experience, the court seems to be the likely 
candidate for leading the movement. Although corporate jurisprudence in 
Korea is currently somewhat undeveloped,139) the decisions the court has 
issued demonstrate a commitment to fair and balanced positions regarding 
takeovers and takeover defenses. Although Korea does not currently have a 
specialized commercial court, international scholars including Stephen 
Choi and Bernard Black have proposed creating an analog to the Delaware 
Chancery Court.140) Regardless of whether such a court is created or current 
136) Hyun Han Shin et al., Stock Market Reactions to the Announcement of Adopting 
Poison-pills in Korea, 52 advanCed CommerCial l. rev. 53 (2010) (Korean).
137) Id.
138) Id.
139) Hwa-Jin Kim, supra note 131, at 245. 
140) See, e.g., Stephen Choi, The Future Direction of Takeover Law in Korea, 7 J. Korean l. 
25, 32 (2007). For the examples of the business courts in the United States, see Marcel Kahan 
& Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 sTan. l. rev. 679, 711 
(2002).
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courts handle the litigation that will arise from takeover disputes, concerns 
about developing judicial expertise and maintaining a sufficient corporate 
law caseload remain.141) These concerns may be outweighed by the judicial 
system’s flexibility; a rigid set of rules can be much more easily maneuvered 
around, while in a court each dispute further builds on the law—a valuable 
asset to countries with limited corporate jurisprudence.142) We believe that 
the court system is the core of the answer to Gilson’s policing question, but 
other forces must supplement these efforts in order for them to be 
effective.143) 
Governmental agencies offer unmatched qualifications for handling 
takeover defense regulation,144) but considering the Chaebol system, these 
agencies may suffer from a lack of proper incentives unless stronger 
political and economic forces develop to push them to carefully protect 
minority shareholders and acquirers. The task is a delicate and constantly 
changing balancing act, one that will be very difficult to achieve with the 
static legislation such agencies tend to promulgate. A well intentioned but 
imbalanced regulatory scheme or legislative overcorrection could cause 
disorder in the delicate system.
Shareholder rights groups have played an important role in the debate 
over adoption of the pill,145) and ideally will remain involved if the bill 
passes. As the market for corporate control becomes more liquid and proxy 
reform occurs, these groups will likely gain influence and could become 
powerful enough to have a strong impact on the outcome of control battles 
through voting recommendations and proxy solicitation. Institutional 
investors will likely follow a similar trajectory, and international hedge 
funds and acquirers may play a more immediate role in improving 
corporate governance in Korea if they are able to obtain large stakes in 
major companies. Such an impact could be especially noticeable if investors 
are able to acquire stakes in Chaebol member firms.  
141) Choi, supra note 140, at 32. 
142) Hwa-Jin Kim, supra note 131, at 275.
143) See hwa-Jin Kim & oK-rial song, mergers and aCquisiTions 409-410 (2009) 
(Korean).
144) Choi, supra note 140, at 32. 
145) Lee, supra note 1.
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Lastly, the Korea Exchange (“KRX”) ought to play a regulatory role 
similar to that of the NYSE and TSE. Choi points out that the national 
exchange is in a position to be incentivized by companies wanting to list 
their stock as well as investors who provide the capital.146) The exchange has 
more freedom to experiment with rules and guidelines than government 
agencies and Korea’s Ministry of Finance and Economy, which could 
further ensure that the rules and guidelines it promulgates protect the 
interests of investors.147)
VI. Concluding Remarks
The United States offers a wealth of substantive experience with the 
poison pill that other countries should take into account and incorporate 
into their own efforts to regulate the takeover defenses. The substance of 
Delaware’s relevant jurisprudence alone is enough to substantially limit 
takeover defenses to mostly desirable circumstances. But neither Delaware 
law nor the United States’ strategy as a whole is perfect, and they continue 
to change. In 2009, under strong pressure from shareholder rights groups, 
the percentage of companies voluntarily requiring shareholder input on the 
implementation of poison pills increased dramatically,148) bringing the 
United States more in line with the Japanese and Korean proposed pill 
structure. This groundbreaking shift lends itself to the conclusion that the 
precedential value of the United States’ strategy lies in its age, not its 
fundamental design—and countries building their own strategies for 
poison pill regulation would be remiss to attempt a simple transplant 
without critical evaluation and customization. 
Japan appears to have laid the groundwork for a successful long-term 
implementation of the poison pill. Even though the isolated nature of the 
Bulldog case does not allow us to draw definitive conclusions about what 
146) Choi, supra note 140, at 34.
147) Id. at 39. For the self-regulation of the Korea Exchange, see generally Bernard Black, 
The Role of Self-Regulation in Supporting Korea’s Securities Markets, in self-regulaTion in The 
Korean seCuriTies marKeT (Hwa-Jin Kim, ed., 2002).
148) John Laide, Shareholder Input on Poison Pills, SharkRepellent.net, June 15, 2009.
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direction the courts will take the poison pill, it does provide sufficient 
analysis for academic critique. The questions raised by the decision in Japan 
will be answered in due time, and at this point there is no immediate threat 
of a sudden spike in hostile takeovers as feared by some academic scholars. 
The questions raised by the Bulldog case will shape the future of the legal 
structure as the courts opt to answer them over time. As was true in 
Delaware, the road to establishing these legal standards will be long and 
complex.
Korea also appears to be laying the groundwork for successful adoption 
of the poison pill. There has been vigorous debate, and the human 
infrastructure necessary to oversee the pill’s use seems to be in place. 
Korea’s experience thus far is fairly analogous to the paths of the United 
States and Japan. One potential complication not thoroughly addressed in 
this article is how a poison pill would mesh with the Chaebol holding 
structure. One argument is that hostile takeovers are finally allowing the 
market to determine the optimal organizational structure and the pill will 
empower Chaebol families to further protect against this change.149) The 
truth is the Chaebol holding structure itself is a more powerful takeover 
defense than the poison pill,150) and perhaps adding liquidity to the market 
for corporate control is best done through other types of corporate 
governance reform. Choi specifically notes that increased fiduciary duties, a 
better framework for shareholder litigation, and a corporate opportunity 
doctrine would all be positive and productive steps for Korea.151) Similarly, 
wider corporate governance reforms could have a strong preventative 
impact on poison pill misuse. The important question is not simply 
whether the poison pill should be adopted or not. The poison pill is little 
more than a tool—one that can be used for different purposes and with 
different motives. Prohibiting its use accomplishes little; there are many 
tools available and as time goes on, new ones will be invented to fill the 
gaps. The underlying goal should be to disincentivize all self-dealing acts 
by incumbent management and arbitrage-driven corporate raids by 
acquirers, by focusing on discouraging these activities and intervening 
149) Choi, supra note 140, at 26.
150) Id. at 35.
151) Id. at 38.
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when they do occur, rather than attempting to regulate the multitude of 
tools and devices the market invents.
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